Dialectica 69 (3):335-355 (2015)

Authors
Michael Lacewing
University College London
Abstract
In this paper, I argue against a perceptual model of moral epistemology. We should not reject the claim that there is a sense in which, on some occasions, emotions may be said to be perceptions of values or reasons. But going further than this, and taking perception as a model for moral epistemology is unhelpful and unilluminating. By focusing on the importance of the dispositions and structures of the self to moral knowledge, I bring out important disanalogies between moral epistemology and typical cases of perceptual expertise. As a result, how we gain, or fail to gain, moral knowledge should not be understood in terms of the operation of a perceptual capacity
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DOI 10.1111/1746-8361.12115
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References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy.Bernard Williams - 1985 - Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

A Truthful Way to Live? Objectivity, Ethics and Psychoanalysis.Michael Lacewing - 2019 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 85:175-193.

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