Boethius on Human Freedom

American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 78 (2):309-327 (2004)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

It is commonly asserted that Boethius defined free will as the judgment of the will or a rational choice. Accordingly, sin or evil is identified with ignorance or vice of the intellect, which prevents or distorts rational deliberation. However, Boethius adopted a more complex understanding of the self-motion of the soul and, consequently, articulated a more nuanced account of sin and the healing effects of Providence. Boethius treated human freedom as a complex including a natural motion, identified as the desire for happiness, the determination of reason following the judgment of deliberation, and the sovereignty of the will over its own acts and, to some extent,over other acts of the soul. Sin, therefore, involves mistaken ideas about reality but also deformations in the affective orientation of the will to the world and in the exercise of the will’s control over the soul

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 74,649

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Boethius.John Marenbon - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Boethius: An Essay.H. F. Stewart - 1891 - B. Franklin.
Boethius on Utterances, Understanding and Reality.Margaret Cameron - 2009 - In John Marenbon (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Boethius. Cambridge University Press. pp. 85.
Rahnerian Freedom: Fundamental Option in Karl Rahner’s Transcendental Anthropology.Mark Joseph T. Calano - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 20:51-68.
Form and Universal in Boethius.Richard Cross - 2012 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20 (3):439-458.
A Tense Logic for Boethius.John N. Martin - 1989 - History and Philosophy of Logic 10 (2):203-212.
Boethius and the Theological Origins of the Concept of Person.Joseph W. Koterski - 2004 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 78 (2):203-224.

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-01-09

Downloads
46 (#252,511)

6 months
1 (#419,921)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references