A Truthful Way to Live? Objectivity, Ethics and Psychoanalysis

Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 85:175-193 (2019)
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Abstract

Is there a best way to live? If so, is this a form of ethical life? The answer, I believe, turns on what we can say about the nature and place of the passions – emotions and desires – in our lives, including in particular, our ability to be truthful about our passions and our relations with other people. I approach the question through the work of Bernard Williams. I consider first what it might be for a way of life to be ‘objectively’ best, before looking more closely at the psychological conditions of such a life, using ideas from psychoanalysis on the way we hide our true passions from ourselves and the effect this can have on our understanding of both ourselves and others. I end by considering whether we can say that a truthful life is the best life, and whether it places universal and material constraints on how best to live.

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Michael Lacewing
University College London

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References found in this work

Moral realism.Peter Railton - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (2):163-207.
Virtue Theory and Abortion.Rosalind Hursthouse - 1991 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 20 (3):223-246.
Emotions and the virtues of self-understanding.Michael Lacewing - 2014 - In Sabine Roeser & Cain Samuel Todd (eds.), Emotion and Value. Oxford University Press UK.
Is Realism Really Bad for You? A Realistic Response.Neera K. Badhwar - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (2):85-107.

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