Miriam Kyselo
Technische Universität Berlin
Ezequiel Di Paolo
University of the Basque Country
Embodied approaches in cognitive science hold that the body is crucial for cognition. What this claim amounts to, however, still remains unclear. This paper contributes to its clarification by confronting three ways of understanding embodiment—the sensorimotor approach, extended cognition and enactivism—with Locked-in syndrome. LIS is a case of severe global paralysis in which patients are unable to move and yet largely remain cognitively intact. We propose that LIS poses a challenge to embodied approaches to cognition requiring them to make explicit the notion of embodiment they defend and its role for cognition. We argue that the sensorimotor and the extended functionalist approaches either fall short of accounting for cognition in LIS from an embodied perspective or do it too broadly by relegating the body only to a historical role. Enactivism conceives of the body as autonomous system and of cognition as sense-making. From this perspective embodiment is not equated with bodily movement but with forms of agency that do not disappear with body paralysis. Enactivism offers a clarifying perspective on embodiment and thus currently appears to be the framework in embodied cognition best suited to address the challenge posed by LIS
Keywords Embodiment  Body  Enactivism  Locked-in syndrome  Extended cognition  Sensorimotor approach
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DOI 10.1007/s11097-013-9344-9
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References found in this work BETA

The Principles of Psychology.William James - 1890 - London, England: Dover Publications.
Phenomenology of Perception.Maurice Merleau-Ponty - 1962 - Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: The Humanities Press.
Action in Perception.Alva Noë - 2005 - MIT Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Making Enactivism Even More Embodied.Shaun Gallagher & Matthew Bower - 2013 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (2):232-247.
Is perceiving bodily action?Kenneth Aizawa - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18 (5):933-946.

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