The Expansion View of Thick Concepts

Noûs 54 (4):914-944 (2019)
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Abstract

This paper proposes a new Separabilist account of thick concepts, called the Expansion View (or EV). According to EV, thick concepts are expanded contents of thin terms. An expanded content is, roughly, the semantic content of a predicate along with modifiers. Although EV is a form of Separabilism, it is distinct from the only kind of Separabilism discussed in the literature, and it has many features that Inseparabilists want from an account of thick concepts. EV can also give non-cognitivists a novel escape from the Anti-Disentangling Argument. §I explains the approach of all previous Separabilists, and argues that there’s no reason for Separabilists to take this approach. §II explains EV. §III fends off objections. And §IV explains how non-cognitivist proponents of EV can escape the Anti-Disentangling Argument.

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Brent G. Kyle
United States Air Force Academy

Citations of this work

Thick Ethical Concepts.Pekka Väyrynen - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Conventional Evaluativity.Julia Zakkou - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy (2):440-454.
Aesthetic Judgments, Evaluative Content, and (Hybrid) Expressivism.Jochen Briesen - 2024 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 11.

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Language, truth and logic.Alfred Jules Ayer - 1936 - London,: V. Gollancz.
The Language of Morals.Richard Mervyn Hare - 1952 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Freedom and reason.Richard Mervyn Hare - 1963 - Oxford,: Clarendon Press.

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