Philosophical Explorations 9 (3):309-325 (2006)

Jack M. C. Kwong
Appalachian State University
In this paper, I present an alternative argument for Jerry Fodor's recent conclusion that there are currently no tenable theories of concepts in the cognitive sciences and in the philosophy of mind. Briefly, my approach focuses on the 'theory-theory' of concepts. I argue that the two ways in which cognitive psychologists have formulated this theory lead to serious difficulties, and that there cannot be, in principle, a third way in which it can be reformulated. Insofar as the 'theory-theory' is supposed to replace, and to rectify the problems of, the earlier 'classical' and 'probabilistic' theories, its failure confirms Fodor's original observation. Since my critique does not rest on controversial philosophical assumptions and is readily available from within the cognitive sciences, it is a stronger argument than Fodor's
Keywords Categorization  Concept  Metaphysics  Mind  Theory  Fodor, Jerry A
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DOI 10.1080/13869790600815830
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References found in this work BETA

Philosophical Investigations.Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein - 1953 - New York, NY, USA: Wiley-Blackwell.

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Is Conceptual Atomism a Plausible Theory of Concepts?Jack M. C. Kwong - 2007 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (3):413-434.

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