Philosophical Psychology 25 (1):77 - 91 (2012)

Authors
Jack M. C. Kwong
Appalachian State University
Abstract
This paper challenges T. S. Gendler's notion of aliefs, a novel kind of mental state which she introduces to explain a wide variety of belief-discordant behaviors. In particular, I argue that many of the cases which she uses to motivate such a mental state can be fully explained by accounts that make use only of commonplace attitudes such as beliefs and desires
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DOI 10.1080/09515089.2011.569915
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References found in this work BETA

Alief and Belief.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):634-663.
Alief in Action (and Reaction).Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (5):552--585.

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Citations of this work BETA

Implicit Bias.Michael Brownstein - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Collective Implicit Attitudes: A Stakeholder Conception of Implicit Bias.Carole J. Lee - 2018 - Proceedings of the 40th Annual Cognitive Science Society.

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