Synthese 194 (5) (2017)

Authors
Jack M. C. Kwong
Appalachian State University
Abstract
Open-mindedness is generally regarded as an intellectual virtue because its exercise reliably leads to truth. However, some theorists have argued that open-mindedness’s truth-conduciveness is highly contingent, pointing out that it is either not truth-conducive at all under certain scenarios or no better than dogmatism or credulity in others. Given such shaky ties to truth, it would appear that the status of open-mindedness as an intellectual virtue is in jeopardy. In this paper, I propose to defend open-mindedness against these challenges. In particular, I show that the challenges are ill-founded because they misconstrue the nature of open-mindedness and fail to consider the requisite conditions of its application. With a proper understanding of open-mindedness and of its requirements, it is clear that recourse to it is indeed truth-conducive
Keywords Open-mindedness  Virtue epistemology  Intellectual virtue   Truth-conduciveness
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Reprint years 2017
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-015-1008-6
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References found in this work BETA

Virtue in Argument.Andrew Aberdein - 2010 - Argumentation 24 (2):165-179.
Open-Mindedness.Wayne Riggs - 2010 - Metaphilosophy 41 (1-2):172-188.

View all 12 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Is Open-Mindedness Truth-Conducive?B. Madison - 2019 - Synthese 196 (5):2075-2087.
The (Virtue) Epistemology of Political Ignorance.Cameron Boult - forthcoming - American Philosophical Quarterly.
The Willingness to Be Rationally Persuaded.Michael David Baumtrog - 2016 - Argumentation, Objectivity, and Bias: Proceedings of the 11th International Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA).

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

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