Theoretical Underpinnings of Wiredu’s Empiricalism
Abstract
Wiredu uses the term ‘empiricalism’ to characterize a mode of thinking that is essentially empirical in orientation but admits non-transcendental metaphysical categories and existents into its systems of thought. Wiredu finds evidence of this mode of thinking in the Akan language. The central question I engage with in this paper is this: what makes empiricalism a plausible system of thought that has universal validity and intelligibility? I argue that the plausibility and universality of empiricalism is evident in Wiredu’s logical and semantic thinking that underpins the theses of empiricalism. Rather than it being an isolated doctrine of Wiredu, the central theses of empiricalism are rooted in, and cast in terms of, his logical and semantic analysis of distinctions such as signification and reference, concept and object, and of his analysis of terms such as ‘existence’. These analyses show that the attractiveness of empiricalism is dependent on theoretical principles other than, and in addition to, the linguistic evidence that Akan provides.