Abstract

On the Habermasial Argument of Parasitism. In this article it is argued that throughout Habermas' various treatments of the problem of 'simple imperatives' (threats etc.) one can find a remaining contradiction: namely between identifying them on the one hand, for logical reasons, as the 'unsocial' acts they are (due to their lack of normativity claims). On the other hand, for fitting into sociological descriptions, Habermas tries to rearrange threats etc. within a so-called 'continuum' of all social actions. These difficulties can only be avoided by recognizing the entirely unsocial character of certain ways of acting. This premiss is applied in an alternative analysis of perlocutions and simple imperatives. It leads to the conclusion that for the sake of logical consistency the possibility of ethical (social) ignorance - the Kantian 'evil'? - must be brought into the categorical account of a grammatical analysis of practical statements