On Denying a Presupposition of Sellars' Problem:A Defense of Propositionalism

Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 50 (4):173-190 (2005)
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Abstract

There is a great divide between two approaches to epistemology over the past thirty to forty years. Some label the divide that between internalists and externalists, and that characterization may be accurate on some account of the distinction. I will pursue the divide from a different direction, in part because the literature on the distinction between internalism and externalism has become a mess, and I don’t want to clean up the mess here

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Jonathan L. Kvanvig
Washington University in St. Louis

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Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?Edmund Gettier - 1963 - Analysis 23 (6):121-123.

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