Counterfactuals: Ambiguities, true premises, and knowledge

Synthese 100 (1):133 - 164 (1994)
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Abstract

In this paper I explore the ambiguity that arises between two readings of the counterfactual construction, then–d and thel–p, analyzed in my bookA Theory of Counterfactuals. I then extend the analysis I offered there to counterfactuals with true antecedents, and offer a more precise formulation of the conception of temporal divergence points used in thel–p interpretation. Finally, I discuss some ramifications of these issues for counterfactual analyses of knowledge.

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Igal Kvart
Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Citations of this work

An Argument for Conjunction Conditionalization.Lee Walters & Robert Williams - 2013 - Review of Symbolic Logic 6 (4):573-588.
Morgenbesser's Coin and Counterfactuals with True Components.Lee Walters - 2009 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt3):365-379.
Counterfactuals.Igal Kvart - 1992 - Erkenntnis 36 (2):139 - 179.
Causal independence.Igal Kvart - 1994 - Philosophy of Science 61 (1):96-114.

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References found in this work

Philosophical explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Epistemology and cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Seeing And Knowing.Fred I. Dretske - 1969 - Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.
Seeing and Knowing.Fred I. Dretske - 1970 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 21 (1):121-124.

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