A super-light survey of the probabilistic account of knowledge

Abstract

The two main insights of the account that are at the heart of the notion of knowledge are that the belief that p amounts to high token indicativity of the fact that p, and that knowledge endows high level of immunity from error. In this outline we shall deal with perceptual knowledge and perception-based memory. For these modes of knowledge, another condition is required, beyond that of high token indicativity, which secures the appropriate discriminability condition for knowledge. These conditions will be spelled out in terms of objective chance. So the truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions of that sort will be in terms of truth, belief and chance alone.

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Igal Kvart
Hebrew University of Jerusalem

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