Abstract

With this dissertation, firstly, I address the issue of Friedrich Nietzsches (1844-1900) so-called immoralism. When he calls himself an immoralist and even the first immoralist (_EH_ Destiny 2), he seems to be the first philosopher to consider morality as something negative, something we had better got rid of. Yet, he favours noble morality and higher moralities which he insists ought to be possible (_BGE_ 202). I shall interpret Nietzsches explicit claim of immoralism and his campaign against morality as a rejection of a particular kind of morality ¾ Christian morality that has become prevalent and predominant as morality itself (_EH_ Destiny 4). His immoralism does not reject the idea of an ethical life.

Nietzsche favours a supra-moral version of life (_GM_ II 2 & _BGE_ 257). The move from a moral to a supra-moral orientation to life implies a kind of self-overcoming, a process which has both a negative (destructive) and a positive (productive) side. Firstly, I shall give an account of the negative side, which involves Nietzsches genealogical critique of morality. In his _Genealogy_, Nietzsche criticizes the man of _ressentiment_, the metaphysical two-worlds distinction: true world and apparent world, and the ascetic ideal of the will to truth, which he considers as a will to nothingness (_GM_ III 28). His notion of perspectivism advocates a plurality of values and perspectives as opposed to any notion of an absolute truth. Then, I shall look into his positive ethic, as exemplified in the figures of Zarathustra and the _Übermensch_, and the paradox of the _Übermensch_as the annihilator of morality (_EH_ Books 1) and as the designation of a type of supreme achievement (_EH_ Books 1). By proclaiming a process of self-overcoming of morality (_BGE_ 32), I believe that Nietzsche proposes an experimental morality in order to improve mankind. He considers morality as a pose, as progress (_BGE_ 216), and mere symptomatology (_TI_ Improvers of Mankind 1). Morality is the effect, or symptom of a continuous improvement within an individual. Nietzsche seeks to make us become aware of our continuous self-improvement, that we should invent our own virtue (_A_ 11) in order to become what we are. Nietzsche envisions the possibility of evolving a magnanimous and courageous human type who is capable of giving style to his character (_GS_ 290), the supreme human achievement ¾ the _Übermensch_. His idea of the _Übermensch_ implies a never-ending struggle for self-perfection and self-fulfilment.

There are affinities between Nietzsches philosophy and Buddhism, such as emphasizing practice, the recognition of the transient nature of human existence, and an emphasis on impermanence. Buddhist teachings show various feasible ways to attain enlightenment and buddhahood. The path to enlightenment and buddhahood can be shown to share some features with Nietzsches process of self-overcoming, which leads to self-transformation and self-perfection. The emphasis on the practice of the spirit of Bodhisattva by Humanistic Buddhism seems to lend itself as complement to Nietzsches philosophy, a notion I explore in the concluding chapter of the dissertation