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Developing intuitions about free will between ages four and six
Cognition 138 (C):79-101 (2015)
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Citations of this work
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Morality constrains the default representation of what is possible.Jonathan Phillips & Fiery Cushman - 2017 - Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 114 (18):4649-4654.
It's not what you did, it's what you could have done.Regan M. Bernhard, Hannah LeBaron & Jonathan Phillips - 2022 - Cognition 228 (C):105222.
A defense of buddhism, meditation, and free will: A theory of mental freedom.Rick Repetti - 2020 - Zygon 55 (2):540-564.
If I am free, you can’t own me: Autonomy makes entities less ownable.Christina Starmans & Ori Friedman - 2016 - Cognition 148 (C):145-153.
References found in this work
Moral responsibility and determinism: The cognitive science of folk intuitions.Shaun Nichols & Joshua Knobe - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):663–685.
Why the Child’s Theory of Mind Really Is a Theory.Alison Gopnik & Henry M. Wellman - 1992 - Mind and Language 7 (1-2):145-71.
Is Belief in Free Will a Cultural Universal?Hagop Sarkissian, Amita Chatterjee, Felipe de Brigard, Joshua Knobe, Shaun Nichols & Smita Sirker - 2010 - Mind and Language 25 (3):346-358.
A Theory of Causal Learning in Children: Causal Maps and Bayes Nets.Alison Gopnik, Clark Glymour, Laura Schulz, Tamar Kushnir & David Danks - 2004 - Psychological Review 111 (1):3-32.
Infants selectively encode the goal object of an actor's reach.A. Woodward - 1998 - Cognition 69 (1):1-34.
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