Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (3):343-344 (2002)
AbstractParsimony and simplicity in cognition theory are not achieved by excluding either the “cognitive unconscious” or consciousness from theoretical modeling, but rather, by eliminating redundant constructs independent of their location on the conscious-unconscious axis. Hence, Perruchet & Vinter's (P&V's) case against the “cognitive unconscious” does not work as an argument for consciousness, but rather as a rejection of the redundant background computational processes postulated in traditional cognition theory.
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