Philosophical Psychology 29 (1):123-132 (2016)

Lukasz Kurowski
York University
In this commentary, I critically assess Rex Welshon’s position on the neural substrates of ownership unity. First, I comment on Welshon’s definition of ownership unity and underline some of the problems stemming from his phenomenological analysis. Second, I analyze Welshon’s proposal to establish a mechanistic relation between neural substrates and ownership unity. I show that it is insufficient and defend my own position on how neural mechanisms may give rise to whole subjects of experience, which I call the neuro-integrative account of consciousness. Lastly, I comment on Welshon’s philosophical contribution and claim that it leaves the reader theoretically stranded
Keywords ownership unity  consciousness  neural substrates  neuro-interactive account
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Reprint years 2016
DOI 10.1080/09515089.2014.972354
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Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness.David Chalmers - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):200-19.
Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap.Joseph Levine - 1983 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (October):354-61.
Consciousness and Mind.David M. Rosenthal - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.

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Searching for the Neural Realizers of Ownership Unity.Rex Welshon - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (6):839 - 862.
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