The Embodied Mind and Anorexia Nervosa

In Bluhm Robyn & Tekin Serife (eds.), The Bloomsbury Companion to the Philosophy of Psychiatry. Bloomsbury. pp. 113-129 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Traditionally, philosophers of mind have been guided by a brainbound approach: the mind, whatever it turns out to be, will be related to or identical with the brain. The body, under this approach, plays a merely instrumental role — it is what keeps the brain alive and healthy. Over the past few decades there has been increasing resistance to the brainbound approach, and a strongly supported push for taking a non-brainbound approach: the body is not merely instrumental, but in many ways constitutive of the mind — the mind, whatever it turns out to be, is bodily in many fundamental respects. Thus, in explaining the mind, we must consider not only brain states, but also wider bodily processes. What those wider bodily processes are, and how they constitute certain mental states, are the key questions that we now face as non-brainbound philosophers of mind. One avenue of investigation that many have taken in view to answering these two questions has been to look at bodily awareness and its relation to our sense of self. How does our body, and our awareness of our body more specifically, constitute our sense of self and our subjective experience of the world. A clear way of investigating this last question is to turn to pathological cases of body awareness, e.g. body dysmorphic disorder and anorexia nervosa. Anorexia nervosa is an interesting case. The DSM-5 distinguishes anorexia nervosa from body dysmorphic disorder — the former is classified as an eating disorder, while the latter is classified as a mental disorder. As I will explore in this chapter, this very manner of distinguishing among such pathologies admits of a traditional brainbound approach to separating the mind/brain from the body. Here I shall consider how a non-brainbound approach might give us different, and perhaps even better insight into cases such as anorexia nervosa, and I shall, conversely, consider how such body awareness disorders might serve to further strengthen the view that the right approach to understanding the mind is the non-brainbound approach.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,202

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Anorexia Nervosa and the Body Uncanny: A Phenomenological Approach.Fredrik Svenaeus - 2013 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 20 (1):81-91.
Anorexia Nervosa as nervous affection.S. Fenwick - 2017 - Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences 10 (1).
"Too Fat" and "Too Thin": Understanding the Bodily Experience of Anorexia Nervosa.Hannah Bowden - 2012 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 19 (3):251-253.
When the self is contested ground.Tommaso Bruni - 2012 - Hastings Center Report 42 (4):4-6.
Anorexia Nervosa.Emily Caroline Martin-Hondros - 2004 - Philosophy in the Contemporary World 11 (1):19-26.
Anorexia Nervosa.Emily Caroline Martin-Hondros - 2004 - Philosophy in the Contemporary World 11 (1):19-26.
Anorexia nervosa.Vicki K. Condit - 1990 - Human Nature 1 (4):391-413.
A Phenomenological Study of Anorexia Nervsoa.Hannah Bowden - 2012 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 19 (3):227-241.
The Fisherman and the Assassin: Reflections on Anorexia Nervosa.Simona Giordano - 2010 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 17 (2):163-167.

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-10-03

Downloads
0

6 months
0

Historical graph of downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Lana Kuhle
Illinois State University

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references