Abstract

I begin this dissertation with a statement of the standard view of Collingwood's philosophy. This is the view that Collingwood's contribution to philosophy lies in the doctrine of the re-enactment of past experience. I further identify as the "accidentalist" hypothesis the interpretation that Collingwood's later philosophy lacks overall coherence. I criticize those interpretive doctrines. In the light of my dissertation, neither the standard view nor the accidentalist hypothesis is tenable. ;Against the standard view I demonstrate in Chapter II that his theory of historical evidence is the central idea of his philosophy of history. I show that for Collingwood historical evidence is whatever the historian can use in asking and answering historical questions. I maintain that his theory of historical evidence is contained in his account of the conceptual relations involved in the process of historical inquiry. I further demonstrate that his doctrine of re-enactment should be understood in the light of the former doctrine. ;I show in Chapter III that Collingwood's historical practice conforms to his theory of history. This has been denied by critics such as Couse. I argue that Couse's criticisms proceed from a misunderstanding of Collingwood's image of the historian as detective. This detective image, properly understood, is not a metaphor for historical inquiry but a logical feature of presuppositional reasoning. ;I argue against the accidentalist interpretation by showing that Collingwood's philosophy is to be understood with reference to method rather than to doctrine. Collingwood's later philosophy offers a persuasive account of fundamental philosophical matters. It is not the exercise in skepticism that some critics take it to be. I show this in Chapter IV. ;In Chapter V, I maintain that Collingwood's theory of presuppositions provides a new philosophical theory, the theory of presuppositional reasoning. This is historical thinking