The Raven Paradox

Amazon Digital Services LLC (2016)
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Abstract

"All ravens are black" is logically but not confirmationally equivalent with "all non-black things are non-ravens." But this is impossible, given that logical equivalence guarantees confirmational equivalence. In this paper, this paradox is solved

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John-Michael Kuczynski
University of California, Santa Barbara (PhD)

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