A proof of the partial anomalousness of the mental

Southern Journal of Philosophy 36 (4):491-504 (1998)
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Abstract

Ontologically, brains are more basic than mental representations. Epistemologically, mental representations are more basic than brains and, indeed, all other non-mental entities: it is, and must be, on the basis of mental representations that we know anything about non-mental entities. Since, consequently, mental representations are epistemically more fundamental than brains, the former cannot possibly be explained in terms of the latter, notwithstanding that the latter are ontologically more fundamental than the former. There is thus an explanatory gap, notwithstanding the presumptive truth of materialism.

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reprint Kuczynski, John-Michael (2010) "A Proof of the Partial Anomalousness of the Mental1". Southern Journal of Philosophy 36(4):491-504

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John-Michael Kuczynski
University of California, Santa Barbara (PhD)

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