Axiomathes:1-20 (forthcoming)

Authors
Pawel Kawalec
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski (KUL)
Adam P. Kubiak
Warsaw University of Technology
Abstract
We show that if among the tested hypotheses the number of true hypotheses is not equal to the number of false hypotheses, then Neyman-Pearson theory of testing hypotheses does not warrant minimal epistemic reliability. We also argue that N-P does not protect from the possible negative effects of the pragmatic value-laden unequal setting of error probabilities on N-P’s epistemic reliability. Most importantly, we argue that in the case of a negative impact no methodological adjustment is available to neutralize it, so in such cases the discussed pragmatic-value-ladenness of N-P inevitably compromises the goal of attaining truth.
Keywords Frequentism  Predictive value  Statistical test  Reliability  Context  Pragmatic values
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DOI 10.1007/s10516-021-09541-y
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References found in this work BETA

Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge.Deborah Mayo - 1996 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 15 (1):455-459.
Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge.Deborah Mayo - 1997 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (3):455-459.

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Citations of this work BETA

The epistemic consequences of pragmatic value-laden scientific inference.Adam P. Kubiak & Paweł Kawalec - 2021 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 11 (2):1-26.
Prior Information in Frequentist Research Designs: The Case of Neyman’s Sampling Theory.Adam P. Kubiak & Paweł Kawalec - forthcoming - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie:1-22.

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