Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (4):595-617 (2010)

Authors
Kristin M. Mickelson
University of Colorado, Boulder (PhD)
Abstract
Derk Pereboom's Four-Case Argument is among the most famous and resilient manipulation arguments against compatibilism. I contend that its resilience is not a function of the argument's soundness but, rather, the ill-gotten gain from an ambiguity in the description of the causal relations found in the argument's foundational case. I expose this crucial ambiguity and suggest that a dilemma faces anyone hoping to resolve it. After a thorough search for an interpretation which avoids both horns of this dilemma, I conclude that none is available. Rather, every metaphysically coherent interpretation invites either a hard- or soft-line reply to Pereboom's argument. I then consider a recharacterization of the dilemma which seems to clear the way for the defence of a revised Four-Case Argument. I address this rejoinder by identifying a still more fundamental problem shared by all viable interpretations of the manipulation cases, showing that each involves a type of manipulation which undermines the victim's agency. Because this diagnosis supports a soft-line reply to every viable interpretation of the argument and can be endorsed by any compatibilist, I consider it the final piece of the Soft-line Solution to the Four-Case Argument. Finally, I suggest a new taxonomy of manipulation arguments, arguing that none that employs the suppressive variety of manipulation found in Pereboom's argument offers a threat to compatibilism
Keywords Manipulation Argument  Four-Case Argument  Soft-Line Reply  Hard-Line Reply  Free Will  Moral Responsibility  Compatibilism
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/00048400903382691
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829.
Physicalism, or Something Near Enough.Jaegwon Kim - 2005 - Princeton University Press.

View all 13 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Free Will, Self‐Creation, and the Paradox of Moral Luck.Kristin M. Mickelson - 2019 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 43 (1):224-256.

View all 25 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2010-08-10

Total views
285 ( #36,832 of 2,499,006 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
12 ( #62,957 of 2,499,006 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes