The phenomenologically manifest

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):115-136 (2007)
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Abstract

Disputes about what is phenomenologically manifest in conscious experience have a way of leading to deadlocks with remarkable immediacy. Disputants reach the foot-stomping stage of the dialectic more or less right after declaring their discordant views. It is this fact, I believe, that leads some to heterophenomenology and the like attempts to found Consciousness Studies on purely third-person grounds. In this paper, I explore the other possible reaction to this fact, namely, the articulation of methods for addressing phenomenological disputes. I suggest two viable methods, of complementary value, which I call “the method of contrast” and “the method of knowability.”

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Uriah Kriegel
Rice University

Citations of this work

Perceptual content and the content of mental imagery.Bence Nanay - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1723-1736.
Recent Issues in High-Level Perception.Grace Helton - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (12):851-862.
Perceptual phenomenology.Bence Nanay - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):235-246.
Phenomenal Contrast: A Critique.Ole Koksvik - 2015 - American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (4):321-334.
Intuition.Ole Koksvik - 2011 - Dissertation, Australian National University

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