Taking as its starting point a previous work by the author which reviewed early philosophical sources on jealousy and proposed both a conceptual and moral account of this much-maligned emotion, the present article reviews the relevant philosophical literature from the last decade or so. Most noticeable is how scarce those sources still are. Special attention is given, however, to a new conceptual model proposed by Purshouse and Fredericks which rejects the standard architectonic of jealousy as a three-party compound emotion. While the essential contours of the new model are rejected, Fredericks is shown to offer some powerful misgivings about putative instrumentalist defences of jealousy. In addition to this new model, a number of other recent writings about jealousy – historical, conceptual and moral – are subjected to critical scrutiny in this overview article.
Keywords Jealousy  Conceptual analysis  Moral justification  Aristotle  Deservingness
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DOI 10.1007/s10677-015-9668-3
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Emotions in the Moral Life.Robert C. Roberts - 2013 - Cambridge University Press.
The Self and its Emotions.Kristján Kristjánsson - 2010 - Cambridge University Press.

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