Free Choice Sequences: A Temporal Interpretation Compatible with Acceptance of Classical Mathematics

Indagationes Mathematicae 30 (3):492-499 (2019)
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Abstract

This paper sketches a way of supplementing classical mathematics with a motivation for a Brouwerian theory of free choice sequences. The idea is that time is unending, i.e. that one can never come to an end of it, but also indeterminate, so that in a branching time model only one branch represents the ‘actual’ one. The branching can be random or subject to various restrictions imposed by the creating subject. The fact that the underlying mathematics is classical makes such perhaps delicate issues as the fan theorem no longer problematic. On this model, only intuitionistic logic applies to the Brouwerian free choice sequences, and there it applies not because of any skepticism about classical mathematics, but because there is no ‘end of time’ from the standpoint of which everything about the sequences can be decided.

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Saul Kripke
Last affiliation: CUNY Graduate Center

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