The Cosmological Argument Without the Principle of Sufficient Reason

Faith and Philosophy 14 (1):62-70 (1997)
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Abstract

We formulate a version of the Cosmological Argument that deploys an epistemic principle of explanation in place of the traditional Principle of Sufficient Reason. The epistemic principle asserts that if there is a possible explanation of a fact, and some proposition is entailed by that explanation and by every other possible explanation of that fact, it is reasonable to accept that proposition. We try to show that there is a possible explanation of the fact that there are contingent beings and that any possible explanation of this fact presupposes that there is a necessary being. We conclude that it is reasonable to believe that there is a necessary being.

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Elmar Joseph Kremer
University of Toronto, St. George Campus

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