Rorty and Normativity

Human Affairs 17 (1):71-77 (2007)
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Abstract

Rorty claims that humans do not have absolute moral norms in metaphysical sense. There are important values and principles for him, but from his idea of contingency followes that he prefers the actual redescription and evaluation of every particular situation.

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Alexander Kremer
Szeged University

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