Occurrent States and the Problem of Counterfeit Belief in Hume's Treatise

Hume Studies 43 (1):61-90 (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX


In his Treatise of Human Nature, Hume defines a belief as "a lively idea related to or associated with a present impression".1 He offers variations on this definition throughout the work, writing, for instance, that "belief is a more vivid and intense conception of an idea, proceeding from its relation to a present impression" and that his "general position" is "that an opinion or belief is nothing but a strong and lively idea deriv'd from a present impression related to it". Lest his readers misunderstand, Hume endeavours to clarify these notions of "vivacity" and "liveliness" by appealing to a cluster of other notions, such...



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 84,213

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Does Hume hold a dispositional account of belief?Jennifer Smalligan Marušić - 2010 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (2):155-183.
Hume on Belief.Michael Hodges & John Lachs - 1976 - Review of Metaphysics 30 (1):3 - 18.
The Role of Reason in Hume's Theory of Belief.A. T. Nuyen - 1988 - Hume Studies 14 (2):372-389.
The Importance of "Mere Conception" in David Hume's Theory of Belief.Catherine Elaine Kemp - 1995 - Dissertation, State University of New York at Stony Brook
Hume on Space and Time: A Defense.Stephen Gerard Coughlan - 1985 - Dissertation, University of Toronto (Canada)
A teoria da causalidade imaginária na filosofia de Hume.Alexandre Arbex Valadares - 2009 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 50 (119):251-268.
Hume's Theory of Belief.Michael M. Gorman - 1993 - Hume Studies 19 (1):89-101.
Filling the Gaps in Hume’s Vacuums.Miren Boehm - 2012 - Hume Studies 38 (1):79-99.
Hume’s Epistemic Naturalism in the Treatise.Tim Black - 2011 - Hume Studies 37 (2):211-242.


Added to PP

29 (#432,497)

6 months
3 (#247,199)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Emily Kress
Brown University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references