Oxford University Press UK (1990)

Abstract
Over the past two decades, academic economics has undergone a mild revolution in methodology. The language, concepts and techniques of noncooperative game theory have become central to the discipline. This book provides the reader with some basic concepts from noncooperative theory, and then goes on to explore the strengths, weaknesses, and future of the theory as a tool of economic modelling and analysis. The central theses are that noncooperative game theory has been a remarkably popular tool in economics over the past decade because it allows analysts to capture essential features of dynamic competition and competition where some parties have proprietary information. The theory is weakest in providing a sense of when it - and equilibrium analysis in particular - can be applied and what to do when equilibrium analysis is inappropriate. Many of these weaknesses can be addressed by the consideration of individuals who are boundedly rational and learn imperfectly from the past. Written in a non-technical style and working by analogy, the book, first given as part of the Clarendon Lectures in Economics, is readily accessible to a broad audience and will be of interest to economists and students alike. Knowledge of game theory is not required as the concepts are developed as the book progresses.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 1992
Buy this book $8.06 used (77% off)   Amazon page
ISBN(s) 9780198283812   0198283814   0198283571
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 72,634
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Mathematical Models: Questions of Trustworthiness.Adam Morton - 1993 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (4):659-674.
Science Studies and the Theory of Games.Jesús P. Zamora Bonilla - 2006 - Perspectives on Science 14 (4):525-557.
What Can We Learn From a Theory of Complexity?Paul Cilliers - 2000 - Emergence: Complexity and Organization 2 (1):23-33.

View all 27 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Evolutionary Game Theory, Morality, and Darwinism.Gary Mar - 2000 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (1-2):1-2.
The Roles of Stories in Applying Game Theory.Till Grüne‐Yanoff & Paul Schweinzer - 2008 - Journal of Economic Methodology 15 (2):131-146.
Reducible and Nonsensical Uses of Game Theory.Boudewijn de Bruin - 2008 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 38 (2):247-266.
A Game Theory Of Logic — A Logic Of Game Theory.Jaakko Hintikka - 1998 - Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 5:315-323.
Book Review. [REVIEW]Kjell Hausken - 2007 - Theory and Decision 62 (3):303-309.
'Testing' Game Theory.Daniel M. Hausman - 2005 - Journal of Economic Methodology 12 (2):211-223.
Accounting for Constitutive Rules in Game Theory.Cyril Hédoin - 2015 - Journal of Economic Methodology 22 (4):439-461.
Purity, Resistance, and Innocence in Utility Theory.R. Duncan Luce - 2008 - Theory and Decision 64 (2-3):109-118.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2015-10-14

Total views
3 ( #1,366,978 of 2,533,674 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #389,210 of 2,533,674 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes