Molnar on Truthmakers for Negative Truths

Metaphysica 19 (2):251-257 (2018)
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Abstract

Molnar argues that the problem of truthmakers for negative truths arises because we tend to accept four metaphysical principles that entail that all negative truths have positive truthmakers. This conclusion, however, already follows from only three of Molnar´s metaphysical principles. One purpose of this note is to set the record straight. I provide an alternative reading of two of Molnar´s principles on which they are all needed to derive the desired conclusion. Furthermore, according to Molnar, the four principles may be inconsistent. By themselves, however, they are not. The other purpose of this note is to propose some plausible further principles that, when added to the four metaphysical theses, entail a contradiction.

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Nils Kürbis
Ruhr-Universität Bochum

Citations of this work

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References found in this work

A World of States of Affairs.D. M. Armstrong - 1997 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
A World of States of Affairs.D. Armstrong - 1993 - Philosophical Perspectives 7:429-440.
A World of States of Affairs.[author unknown] - 1997 - Philosophy 74 (287):130-134.
Truthmakers for negative truths.George Molnar - 2000 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (1):72 – 86.
A World of States of Affairs.[author unknown] - 1999 - Noûs 33 (3):473-495.

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