European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 14 (2):27-46 (2018)
AbstractThis paper considers whether incompatibilism, the view that negation is to be explained in terms of a primitive notion of incompatibility, and Fregeanism, the view that arithmetical truths are analytic according to Frege’s definition of that term in §3 of Foundations of Arithmetic, can both be upheld simultaneously. Both views are attractive on their own right, in particular for a certain empiricist mind-set. They promise to account for two philosophical puzzling phenomena: the problem of negative truth and the problem of epistemic access to numbers. For an incompatibilist, proofs of numerical non-identities must appeal to primitive incompatibilities. I argue that no analytic primitive incompatibilities are forthcoming. Hence incompatibilists cannot be Fregeans.
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Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik: Eine Logische Mathematische Untersuchung Über den Begriff der Zahl.Gottlob Frege - 1988 - Felix Meiner Verlag.
Anti-Realism and Logic: Truth as Eternal.Neil Tennant - 1987 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
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