Abstract

Why do men and women sometimes risk their necks to defend their liberties? Montesquieu's philosophy of liberalism combines a realist's account of the political institutions that support individual liberty, centering on the separation of powers, with a fine sensitivity to the forms of motivation needed to sustain them. This thesis examines the motivation, or set of motivations, that Montesquieu calls "honor." As he presents it in The Spirit of the Laws, honor is the principled but ambitious self-concern that animates resistance to political authority when that authority oversteps its constitutional limits and encroaches on individual liberties. Those with honor think too much of themselves to endure the abuse of power, and so distinguish themselves by their disobedience in defense of their liberty. As such, honor is an important source of political agency, for it can inspire the vigorous defense of individual liberties even when the risks are high and the benefits are uncertain. ;The analysis draws primarily on The Spirit of the Laws, with supplementary consideration of other works by Montesquieu. It systematically elaborates the meaning and the significance of honor, and shows that honor is more central to Montesquieu's liberalism as a whole than previous scholarship has acknowledged. Additionally, the study shows that honor is an important resource from within classical liberalism for understanding political agency better than it presently is understood in political theory. Although the relationship between honor and democracy is tense, liberal democracy needs honor in some form if it is to sustain itself over time. And while honor cannot provide a complete account of political agency in liberal democracy, it can advance our understanding of political agency, and of the complex forms of motivation that support it.