Abstract

Boyle’s account of self-consciousness is inspired by a long-standing theme in Kant and the post-Kantian idealist tradition, according to which “self-consciousness transforms the general character of human knowing” (Boyle 2023, 12). In this paper, I explore similarities and differences between Kant’s view (as I understand it) and Boyle's Sartrean view. I will argue, first, that the kind of pre-reflective self-consciousness that Boyle locates in Sartre’s conception of non-positional (self-)consciousness can also be retrieved from Kant’s account of transcendental self-consciousness. Second, I will argue that the Kantian idealist tradition highlights not only the epistemic implications of self-consciousness, which Boyle focuses on, but also its implications for the ‘ontological status’ of a being with such self-conscious­ ness. The central insight of the Kantian tradition is, then, that self-consciousness transforms not only our way of knowing the world, but also our way of being in the world as self-conscious minds.