Abstract
A central tactic in Philo’s criticism of the design argument is the introduction of several
alternative hypotheses, each of which is alleged to explain apparent design at least as well as
Cleanthes’ analogical inference to an intelligent designer. In Part VI, Philo proposes that the
world “…is an animal, and the Deity is the soul of the world, actuating it, and actuated by it”
(DNR 6.3; 171); in Part VII, he suggests that “…it is a palpable and egregious partiality” to favour
reason as a probable cause of apparent design over other principles such as instinct, generation,
vegetation, and “… a hundred others which lie open to our conjecture” (DNR 7.11; 178); and in
Part VIII, he offers an ‘Epicurean’ hypothesis according to which the appearance of design is due
to matter itself.1
It is widely agreed that by the end of Part VIII, Philo has convincingly shown
that the empirical evidence considerably underdetermines the conclusion Cleanthes purported it
to establish. Philo, at any rate, declares a sceptical triumph: “A total suspense of judgement is
here our only reasonable resource” (DNR 8.12; 186-7).
Philo’s swift argument for divine amorality at the end of Part XI contrasts markedly with
this scepticism.2 Here, Philo reasons with great confidence concerning what he takes to be the
(only) four hypotheses concerning the morality of the first cause(s) of the universe: divine
benevolence, divine malevolence, Manicheeism, and divine amorality. He argues briefly against
the first, summarily rejects the second and third, and declares with apparent sincerity that “[t]he
true conclusion is, that the original source of all things is entirely indifferent to all these
principles, and has no more regard to good above ill than to heat above cold, or to drought above
moisture, or to light above heavy” (DNR 11.15; 212).
I first discuss Philo’s argument for divine amorality, and I distinguish it from his earlier
criticisms of any inference from mundane data to divine benevolence. In Section 2, I diagnose
deficiencies in two contrary interpretations of the argument for divine amorality. In Section 3, I
offer three reasons for rejecting the surface meaning of this argument. In Section 4, I reveal
Philo’s argument to be a sophisticated parody of both Cleanthes’ natural theology and his appeal
to the passional influence of the design hypothesis. Philo, I argue, does not intend to show that
the Deity is probably amoral; rather, he intends to show Cleanthes – by literally arguing with
him “in his own way” (DNR 2.11; 145) – that the tools of Cleanthes’ ‘experimental theism’ can
equally be wielded in service of a wholly incompatible view.