When it is Not Logically Necessary for a Necessary Condition of Value to be Valuable

Abstract

The premise that it is logically necessary for a necessary condition of value to be valuable is sometimes used in metaethics in support of the claim that agency, or some constitutive condition of agency or action, has value for all agents. I focus on the most recent application of this premise by Caroline T. Arruda and argue that the premise is false. Despite this defect the relevant evaluative step could still work just in case of agency if an additional condition were satisfied.

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References found in this work

Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
The sources of normativity.Christine Marion Korsgaard - 1996 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Onora O'Neill.
Reasons Without Rationalism.Kieran Setiya - 2007 - Princeton University Press.
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The Guise of the Good.J. David Velleman - 1992 - Noûs 26 (1):3 - 26.

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