Logical Pluralism from a Pragmatic Perspective

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):578-591 (2018)
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Abstract

This paper presents a new view of logical pluralism. This pluralism takes into account how the logical connectives shift, depending on the context in which they occur. Using the Question-Under-Discussion Framework as formulated by Craige Roberts, I identify the contextual factor that is responsible for this shift. I then provide an account of the meanings of the logical connectives which can accommodate this factor. Finally, I suggest that this new pluralism has a certain Carnapian flavour. Questions about the meanings of the connectives or the best logic outside of a specified context are not legitimate questions.

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Teresa Kouri Kissel
Old Dominion University

Citations of this work

Counterlogicals as Counterconventionals.Alexander W. Kocurek & Ethan J. Jerzak - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 50 (4):673-704.
Why logical pluralism?Colin R. Caret - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 20):4947-4968.
Disagreement about logic from a pluralist perspective.Erik Stei - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3329-3350.

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References found in this work

Scorekeeping in a language game.David Lewis - 1979 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):339--359.
Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 4 (11):20-40.
Context.Robert Stalnaker - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Doubt truth to be a liar.Graham Priest - 2006 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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