Logos and Episteme 12 (3):369-374 (2021)
AbstractFrancesco Praolini has recently put pressure on the view that justified believability is closed under conjunction introduction. Based on what he calls ‘the hybrid paradox,’ he argues that accepting the principle of conjunction closure for justified believability, quite surprisingly, entails that one must also accept the principle of factivity for justified believability, i.e. that there are no propositions that are justifiably believable and false at the same time. But proponents of conjunction closure can do without factivity, as I argue in this short note. A less demanding principle is available.
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