Coherence and Common Causes: Against Relevance-Sensitive Measures of Coherence

Abstract

Changing weather conditions and barometer changes usually coincide. Accordingly, the propositions that my barometer falls and that the weather conditions deteriorate are quite coherent—especially under the assumption that there is a drop in atmospheric pressure. Nevertheless, scenarios like these involving common causes turn out to be highly problematic for a prominent class of probabilistic coherence measures, namely, those explicating coherence based on the idea of relevance-sensitivity. In this article, we show that none of these measures accords with the intuition that in the light of a common cause, two propositions referring to the cause’s effects should turn out to be coherent. This result casts doubts on the view that these measures can be considered proper explications of the concept of coherence. 1Introduction2Relevance-Sensitive Coherence Measures3Common Causes, Screening-off, and Coherence4Discussion 4.1Multiple explications of coherence4.2Conditionalization versus set expansion5Conclusion

Download options

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 72,805

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-12-01

Downloads
31 (#373,353)

6 months
1 (#386,031)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Michael Schippers
University of Oldenburg

Citations of this work

Towards a Pluralistic View of Formal Methods.Ko-Hung Kuan - 2020 - Dissertation, London School of Economics

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Plausibilistic Coherence.John R. Welch - 2014 - Synthese 191 (10):2239-2253.
Towards a Grammar of Bayesian Coherentism.Michael Schippers - 2015 - Studia Logica 103 (5):955-984.
Measuring Coherence.Igor Douven & Wouter Meijs - 2007 - Synthese 156 (3):405 - 425.