Abstract

This dissertation is a detailed analysis of the debate between liberals and communitarians, focusing on the proper place of character and agency development, roles and commitments, and preference formation and practical reason in political theory. My analysis supports several conclusions. ;Firstly, I maintain that the supposed Kantian metaphysical foundations of some liberalisms ought not to be the preoccupation of communitarians. And neither ought communitarians to advocate communities for their own sake. ;Instead, I maintain that communitarians frequently and correctly argue that there is an important domain of personal qualities beyond those of tolerance and rationality instrumentally defined, one which is vital to individual development and pursuit of a conception of the good, but one which contemporary "Neutralist Liberals" tend to ignore. Within this domain we find the goods of commitment and affiliation, and virtues such as good judgment, willpower, seriousness, and integrity. ;In placing their emphasis on generic virtues associated with our capacities as agents, and on the promotion of these virtues, communitarians are able to recognize the value of autonomy and the importance of protecting core individual rights. The communitarian must, however, insist that a fuller autonomy involves something more than simple non-interference from others. Autonomy conceived in this way requires both the absence of coercive interference and also the right kind of interference or social involvement, which may be fostered by what I shall call "communitarian supplementation." ;I further argue that the liberal ideals of freedom and equality are able to accommodate this sort of communitarian supplementation. This claim of mine contradicts what libertarians generally and what some liberal egalitarians--those who focus either narrowly on resources or on subjectively defined welfare--would argue. ;Moreover, I propose a variety of social forms or institutions that might plausibly provide this supplementation, including: education of a kind, enhanced institutions of democratic decision-making, certain public goods and spaces that encourage communicative interaction, and institutions that encourage a general respect for what we might call intrinsic or impersonal goods. I conclude that when these sorts of institutions are in place, then the communitarian supplementation of core liberal rights is complete.