Infinity up on Trial: Reply to Feferman

Journal of Philosophy 113 (5/6):247-260 (2016)
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Abstract

In this paper I examine Feferman’s reasons for maintaining that while the statements of first-order number theory are “completely clear'” and “completely definite,”' many of the statements of analysis and set theory are “inherently vague'” and “indefinite.”' I critique his four central arguments and argue that in the end the entire case rests on the brute intuition that the concept of subsets of natural numbers—along with the richer concepts of set theory—is not “clear enough to secure definiteness.” My response to this final, remaining point will be that the concept of “being clear enough to secure definiteness” is about as clear a case of an inherently vague and indefinite concept as one might find, and as such it can bear little weight in making a case against the definiteness of analysis and set theory.

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Peter Koellner
Harvard University

Citations of this work

The Price of Mathematical Scepticism.Paul Blain Levy - 2022 - Philosophia Mathematica 30 (3):283-305.

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