Philosophical Quarterly 70 (280):625-632 (2020)
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| Abstract |
Pandispositionalists have not refuted the charge that their ideology precludes knowledge of the external world. Their replies boil down to the claim that some dispositions can be detected without the mediation of their effects. But this reply is ineffective if the regress is restated in terms of mind-independent domains of science.
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| DOI | 10.1093/pq/pqz052 |
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References found in this work BETA
A Metaphysics for Scientific Realism: Knowing the Unobservable.Anjan Chakravartty - 2007 - Cambridge University Press.
Properties, Causation, and Projectibility: Reply to Shoemaker.Richard Swinburne - 1980 - In L. J. Cohen & M. Hesse (eds.), Applications of Inductive Logic. Oxford University Press. pp. 313-20.
Properties, Causation and Projectability.Sydney Shoemaker - 1980 - In L. J. Cohen & M. Hesse (eds.), Applications of Inductive Logic. Clarendon Press. pp. 291-312.
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