Revisiting the Epistemic Regress of Dispositions

Philosophical Quarterly 70 (280):625-632 (2020)
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Abstract

Pandispositionalists have not refuted the charge that their ideology precludes knowledge of the external world. Their replies boil down to the claim that some dispositions can be detected without the mediation of their effects. But this reply is ineffective if the regress is restated in terms of mind-independent domains of science.

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10.1093/pq/pqz052

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Daniel Kodaj
Eotvos Lorand University of Sciences

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References found in this work

Nature's Metaphysics: Laws and Properties.Alexander Bird - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Properties, causation and projectability.Sydney Shoemaker - 1980 - In Laurence Jonathan Cohen & Mary Brenda Hesse (eds.), Applications of inductive logic: proceedings of a conference at the Queen's College, Oxford 21-24, August 1978. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 291-312.

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