Philosophical Quarterly 70 (280):625-632 (2020)

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Abstract
Pandispositionalists have not refuted the charge that their ideology precludes knowledge of the external world. Their replies boil down to the claim that some dispositions can be detected without the mediation of their effects. But this reply is ineffective if the regress is restated in terms of mind-independent domains of science.
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DOI 10.1093/pq/pqz052
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References found in this work BETA

Properties, Causation, and Projectibility: Reply to Shoemaker.Richard Swinburne - 1980 - In L. J. Cohen & M. Hesse (eds.), Applications of Inductive Logic. Oxford University Press. pp. 313-20.
Properties, Causation and Projectability.Sydney Shoemaker - 1980 - In L. J. Cohen & M. Hesse (eds.), Applications of Inductive Logic. Clarendon Press. pp. 291-312.

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