Climate Model Confirmation: From Philosophy to Predicting Climate in the Real World

In Elisabeth A. Lloyd & Eric Winsberg (eds.), Climate Modelling: Philosophical and Conceptual Issues. Springer Verlag. pp. 325-359 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Philosophical perspectives on numerical models help us to understand concepts, but will not predict the climate in the future. Studying climate model results in isolation on the other hand may seduce us to believe what we simulate will actually happen. A model is neither correct nor wrong as such; it is simply more or less useful as a representational tool for a certain purpose. I argue that process understanding is the key to make judgments about when this tool is adequate for insight relevant to certain aspects of the real world. It is only through understanding the relationships in components and variables of the climate and their representation in models, combined with understanding what our models are supposed to do, that we can make better use of them.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,122

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Understanding pluralism in climate modeling.Wendy Parker - 2006 - Foundations of Science 11 (4):349-368.
The epistemology of climate models and some of its implications for climate science and the philosophy of science.Joel Katzav - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 46 (2):228-238.
Varieties of support and confirmation of climate models.Elisabeth A. Lloyd - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):213-232.
Predictivism and old evidence: a critical look at climate model tuning.Mathias Frisch - 2015 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 5 (2):171-190.
Climate models, calibration, and confirmation.Charlotte Werndl & Katie Steele - 2013 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (3):609-635.
II—Wendy S. Parker: Confirmation and adequacy-for-Purpose in Climate Modelling.Wendy S. Parker - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):233-249.
Climate Models, Calibration, and Confirmation.Katie Steele & Charlotte Werndl - 2013 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (3):609-635.
Confirmation and Robustness of Climate Models.Elisabeth A. Lloyd - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (5):971–984.
Introduction.Elisabeth A. Lloyd & Eric Winsberg - 2018 - In Elisabeth A. Lloyd & Eric Winsberg (eds.), Climate Modelling: Philosophical and Conceptual Issues. Springer Verlag. pp. 1-28.

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-06-17

Downloads
23 (#626,176)

6 months
5 (#441,012)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references