Two information measures for inconsistent sets
Journal of Logic, Language and Information 12 (2):227-248 (2003)
Abstract
I present two measures of information for both consistentand inconsistent sets of sentences in a finite language ofpropositional logic. The measures of information are based onmeasures of inconsistency developed in Knight (2002).Relative information measures are then provided corresponding to thetwo information measures.Reprint years
2004
DOI
10.1023/a:1022351919320
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Citations of this work
On the measure of conflicts: Shapley Inconsistency Values.Anthony Hunter & Sébastien Konieczny - 2010 - Artificial Intelligence 174 (14):1007-1026.
Analysing inconsistent first-order knowledgebases.John Grant & Anthony Hunter - 2008 - Artificial Intelligence 172 (8-9):1064-1093.
Paraconsistent conjectural deduction based on logical entropy measures I: C-systems as non-standard inference framework.Paola Forcheri & Paolo Gentilini - 2005 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 15 (3):285-319.
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