Reflective Equilibrium

In Adrian Blau (ed.), Methods in Analytical Political Theory. Cambridge University Press. pp. 46-64 (2017)
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Abstract

The method of reflective equilibrium focuses on the relationship between principles and judgments. Principles are relatively general rules for comprehending the area of enquiry. Judgments are our intuitions or commitments, ‘at all levels of generality’ (Rawls 1975: 8), regarding the subject matter. The basic idea of reflective equilibrium is to bring principles and judgments into accord. This can be achieved by revising the principles and/or the judgments. I first look at normative political judgments (Section 2) before considering the role of principles, arguments, devices of representation and background theory in wide reflective equilibrium (Section 3). I then consider two of the main challenges to the method (Section 4), and show how to use it to deliberate about substantive political principles (Section 5). I conclude with an extended example of the method in action (Section 6).

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Carl Knight
University of Glasgow

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