Russell's paradox and some others

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 22 (4):321-338 (1971)
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Abstract

Though the phrase 'x is true of x' is well formed grammatically, it does not express any predicate in the logical sense, because it does not satisfy the principle of reduction for statements containing 'x is true of'. recognition of this allows for solution of russell's paradox without his restrictive theory of types

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Citations of this work

Grounding, dependence, and paradox.Steve Yablo - 1982 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1):117 - 137.
Truth and what is said.Elia Zardini - 2008 - Philosophical Perspectives 22 (1):545-574.
Ontological variance and scientific objectivity.Michael Martin - 1972 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 23 (3):252-256.

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References found in this work

The Principles of Mathematics.Bertrand Russell - 1903 - Cambridge, England: Allen & Unwin.
The Principles of Mathematics.Bertrand Russell - 1903 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 11 (4):11-12.
Russell's Mathematical Logic.Kurt Gödel - 1946 - In Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, 2nd edition. Evanston, IL: The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc.. pp. 123-154.

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