Markus Kneer
University of Zürich
The recent controversy about misinformation has moved a question into the focus of the public eye that has occupied philosophers for decades: Under what conditions is it appropriate to assert a certain claim? When asserting a claim that x, must one know that x? Must x be true? Might it be normatively acceptable to assert whatever one believes? In the largest cross-cultural study to date (total n = 1,091) on the topic, findings from the United States, Germany, and Japan suggest that, in order to claim that x, x need not be known, and it can be false. However, the data show, we do expect considerable epistemic responsibility on the speaker’s behalf: In order to appropriately assert a claim, the speaker must have good reasons to believe it.
Keywords assertion  speech acts  communication  norms  misinformation
Categories (categorize this paper)
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Truth and Assertion: Rules Vs Aims.Neri Marsili - 2018 - Analysis 78 (4):638–648.
Assertion.Peter Pagin - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Experimental Work on the Norms of Assertion.John Turri - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (7):e12425.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Assertion is Weak.Matthew Mandelkern & Kevin Dorst - forthcoming - Philosophers' Imprint.
Culture and Cognitive Science.Andreas De Block & Daniel Kelly - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Contextualism Vs. Relativism: More Empirical Data.Markus Kneer - 2022 - In Jeremy Wyatt, Julia Zakkou & Dan Zeman (eds.), Perspectives on Taste. Routledge.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

You Gotta Believe.John Turri - 2014 - In Clayton Littlejohn & John Turri (eds.), Epistemic norms: new essays on action, belief and assertion. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. pp. 193-199.
Epistemic Norms of Assertion and Action.Mikkel Gerken & Esben Nedenskov Petersen - 2020 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Assertion: A Defective Theoretical Category.Herman Cappelen - 2020 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Norms of Assertion.Graham Oppy - 2007 - In Geo Siegwart & Dirk Griemann (eds.), Truth and Speech Acts: Studies in the Philosophy of Language. Routledge. pp. 5--226.
Knowledge Guaranteed.John Turri - 2013 - Noûs 47 (3):602-612.
``Knowing and Asserting&Quot.Timothy Williamson - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (4):489-523.
Experimental Work on the Norms of Assertion.John Turri - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (7):e12425.
Assertion and Rejection.Julian J. Schlöder - forthcoming - In Daniel Altshuler (ed.), Linguistics Meets Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.
Prompting Challenges.John Turri - 2010 - Analysis 70 (3):456-462.


Added to PP index

Total views
37 ( #305,071 of 2,499,685 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
26 ( #33,574 of 2,499,685 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes