Aesthetic Value and the Primacy of the Practical in Kant's Philosophy

Journal of Value Inquiry 36 (2):369-382 (2002)
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Kant's account of aesthetic value is easily ignored or subordinated by the recent stress on the primacy of the practical in his system. For Kant, vindicating reason not only requires a methodological distinction between principles of thought and knowledge on the one side, and of action and morality on the other, but the introduction of a third "faculty," feeling, along with its own principle of judgment. Christine Korsgaard has interpreted Kant's overall account of rationality in terms of a kind of rationalist constructivism, the spirit of which she traces to his humanism. She argues that, for Kant, the source of all value is ultimately humanity itself, or, to be more precise, humanity insofar as it is capable of full rational autonomy. Kant's own statement of the primacy of practical reason turns out to be far from clear



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Jane Ellen Kneller
Colorado State University

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Kant-Bibliographie 2002.Margit Ruffing - 2004 - Kant Studien 95 (4):505-538.

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