Another Dimension to Deep Disagreements: Trust in Argumentation

Topoi 40 (5):1187-1204 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

It has typically been assumed that affective and social components of disagreement, such as trust and fair treatment, can be handled separately from substantive components, such as beliefs and logical principles. This has freed us to count as “deep” disagreements only those which persist even between people who have no animosity towards each other, feel equal to one another, and are willing to argue indefinitely in search of truth. A reliance on such ideal participants diverts us from the question of whether we have swept away the opportunity for some real arguers to have their voices heard, and for those voices to determine the real substance of the disagreement. If affective and social issues need to be assessed side by side with belief differences and reasoning paradigms, investigating trust may assist us to understand and make progress on the affective and social components that are involved in disagreement.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,322

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The Methodological Usefulness of Deep Disagreement.Steven W. Patterson - 2015 - Cogency: Journal of Reasoning and Argumentation 6 (2).
Wittgenstein and the logic of deep disagreement.David Godden & William H. Brenner - 2010 - Cogency: Journal of Reasoning and Argumentation 2:41-80.
What is Deep Disagreement?Chris Ranalli - 2018 - Topoi 40 (5):983-998.
Wittgenstein and Deep Disagreement.Ranalli Chris - 2017 - The Philosophers' Magazine 79:50-55.
Three Aspects of Interpersonal Trust.Bernd Lahno - 2004 - Analyse & Kritik 26 (1):30-47.

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-12-19

Downloads
21 (#711,668)

6 months
9 (#288,926)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

References found in this work

Thinking, Fast and Slow.Daniel Kahneman - 2011 - New York: New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
A practical study of argument.Trudy Govier - 1991 - Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Pub. Co..
The logic of deep disagreements.Robert Fogelin - 1985 - Informal Logic 7 (1):3-11.
Coalescent argumentation.Michael A. Gilbert - 1995 - Argumentation 9 (5):837-852.
The Logic of Deep Disagreements.Robert Fogelin - 2005 - Informal Logic 25 (1):3-11.

View all 29 references / Add more references