Teleology, Intentionality, Naturalism

Filozofia 64 (2):114-122 (2009)
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Abstract

After a brief analysis of the specifics of teleological explanations as opposed to causal explanations, the paper seeks to establish the irreducibility of the former to the latter by arguing that teleological explanations are inextricably tied to our notion of intentionality. Since this result undermines the very possibility of “a physicalist reduction” of the explanation of teleological phenomena, especially of human beha- vior, the rest of the paper develops an argument against the perceived need of any such reduction. According to the conclusion of the paper, a more promising program is the development of a “modern, scientific Aristotelianism”, one that can provide a consistent conceptual framework that accommodates both types of explanation

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Gyula Klima
Fordham University

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